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THE EXECUTION OF THE DUC D'ENGHIEN

I.

IN September, 1802, after the peace of Amiens and the consequent disbandment of the army of Condé, the Duc d'Enghien, the last male descendant of the Bourbon-Condé family, came to Ettenheim near the Rhine to live.¹ His reason for choosing this village was that he might be with the Princess Charlotte de Rohan, whom he had met there in 1795 and with whom he had fallen in love. "No one," he wrote in 1799, "could be more lovely, more tender, and more constantly perfect in every way."² They were probably married privately toward the end of 1802, by her uncle, the Cardinal de Rohan, just before his death.³ The house which the Duc rented at Ettenheim was small but comfortable; he was obliged to live very economically, for he had scarcely anything except the pension which England had finally consented to give him, the first payment of which was made in August, 1802. Around the house was a garden which he had laid out and in which he delighted to work with the two or three friends who remained with him. The occupation of which he was most fond was the chase, for there was fine hunting in the neighborhood and especially in the Black Forest.

In the early part of 1803 a rumor gained credence in England that the Duc d'Enghien's boldness and rashness had got the better of his reason, and that he had entered France as far as Strasburg several times, and had even had the folly to go to Paris. This rumor is important because, although wholly false, it reached the ears of Bonaparte later, was believed by him, and thus became one of the several coincidences which were to result fatally for the young prince. Believing the rumor, the old Prince of Condé wrote severely to him on the 16th of June, 1803, "You must admit it was useless to risk your liberty and your life Your position may be

¹ Louis-Antoine-Henri de Bourbon was born at Chantilly, August 2, 1772. His father, the Duc de Bourbon, son of the Prince de Condé, was an eighth cousin to the kings Louis XVI. and Louis XVIII. ; had he outlived his father and grandfather he would have been the tenth Prince de Condé.

² Letter of the Duc d'Enghien, April 1, 1799, quoted in *Les Dernières Années du Duc d'Enghien* by Boulay de la Meurthe (Paris, 1886), p. 9.

³ Welschinger, *Le Duc d'Enghien* (Paris, 1888), pp. 282-289, brings forward many facts which leave little doubt that they were finally married, though the fact has been frequently denied.

very useful in many respects, but you are very near; take care and do not neglect any precaution to get warning in time and make a safe retreat in case the Consul should take it into his head to have you seized. Do not think there is any courage in acting in defiance in this respect. It would be a rashness unpardonable in the eyes of the whole world and could only have the most frightful consequences."¹ The words seem truly prophetic. This serious warning was given to the Duc nine months before the seizure, by his own grandfather, who was well versed in European intrigues, and better able than any one else to advise him.

This warning of the old Prince evidently piqued the young man a little, for he wrote back that upon his honor he had not entered France. "One must know me very little to be able to say or seek to make others believe that I have put my foot on republican soil, except with the rank and station to which the chance of birth entitles me. I am too proud basely to bow my head. The First Consul can perhaps succeed in destroying me, but he cannot humiliate me. One may travel incognito among the glaciers of Switzerland as I did last year, not having anything better to do; but as for France, when I travel there, I shall have no need to conceal myself."² This clear statement of a man, one of whose chief characteristics was perfect sincerity and openness, can leave no doubt in any one's mind that the rumor was wholly false. Nor is it likely that between the date of this letter (July 18, 1803) and his seizure he ever so far changed his manner of thinking as to enter France even so far as Strasburg, much less to come in disguise to Paris to talk with assassins, as Bonaparte's overzealous spies and advisers represented. This view is confirmed by a letter which the Duc's private secretary, Jacques, wrote in 1823, in which he affirmed that during the residence of the Duc at Ettenheim the latter had never once entered France, and that the Duc had said to him, "I wish to be able, in case of need, to affirm on my honor that I have not been in France."³

Another letter of importance was the result of Bonaparte's offer to Louis XVIII. of a pension if he would renounce his claims to the throne. Louis XVIII. made this offer known to the members of his family, declaring at the same time in firm language that he would never renounce an inalienable right which he held from birth. The Duc d'Enghien, without waiting to consult his family, wrote immediately on March 22, 1803: "The letter which your

¹ *Mémoires de la Maison de Condé*, II. 365, quoted by Boulay, 50.

² *Ibid.*, 51.

³ *Mémoires sur la Révolution Française: La Catastrophe du Duc d'Enghien*, (Paris, 1824), p. 294.

Majesty has deigned to send me has just arrived. . . . I am a Frenchman, Sire, and a Frenchman faithful to my God, to my king and to my oaths of honor. Many will perhaps envy me one day this three-fold advantage. I beg that you will allow me to join my signature to that of the Duc d'Angoulême, adhering, as he does, with my heart and soul, to the contents of the letter of my king."¹ Louis, proud of the noble letter, sent a copy of it to the old Prince of Condé, who allowed it to appear in the English newspapers. Bonaparte may have read it at that time ; at any rate it was called to his attention by one of his advisers in March, 1804, and was one additional injury which he imagined the Duc had done him ; for this rebuff from Louis XVIII. had been a bitter pill to the First Consul and he felt doubly angry at any émigré who applauded the king's action.

The quiet calm of Ettenheim with its hunting, love-making, and other innocent amusements was very pleasant, but could not fail to become monotonous and oppressive to a man of Enghien's active, ambitious temperament ; and this ambition was quite justifiable and natural. Heir of "le grand Condé," he had heard of his ancestor's glories from the cradle ; for ten years, as an exile from France, he had sat by the camp-fire and listened to the tales of the great deeds of war achieved by his countrymen in the past ; and now at the age of thirty he burned to do something to show himself worthy of his ancestors and of France. The field of battle was the place which his birth, his surroundings, and his natural inclinations pointed out to him as that in which he was to do his work and make himself famous. All the while he was at Ettenheim he tried to keep in touch with the political world. Living only a few miles from the Rhine frontier he gathered much information about the plans of the First Consul and heard many complaints and rumors from persons in France who were opposed to the Consulate, little imagining that the First Consul would one day choose to regard such harmless letters from discontented people in France as a proof that the Duc was a conspirator and had been trying to excite a mutiny among the French troops in Alsace, for which he ought to be put to death.

By the beginning of the year 1804 the political horizon seemed to foreshadow a general continental war as soon as the weather permitted the armies to take the field. The Duc d'Enghien had received a note from the English government asking him to notify the émigrés in his neighborhood of an increase in their pensions. Now surely was the time to solicit from England an active part in the campaign which was to begin on the German frontier. Accordingly,

¹ Welschinger, p. 226 ; Boulay, p. 45.

on January 15, he sent through Sir Charles Stuart, the English envoy at the Austrian court, a note asking for a military appointment from the English government. He "begs His British Majesty to employ him, no matter how nor in what position, against his implacable enemies in case a continental war breaks out :—whether in allowing him to serve in the armies of the Powers allied with England ; or to join the first English troops on the continent wherever they may land ; or in deigning to confide to him some auxiliary troops in which he could appoint some old faithful French officers and the deserters who might join him. There will be many of them at this moment in the troubles of the Republic ; of this the Duc d'Enghien has convinced himself in a most positive manner by a two years' residence on the frontiers of France."¹ From this letter it is clear that the Duc had no idea of assisting any conspiracy against the First Consul by raising a rebellion in Alsace, as Bonaparte persisted in saying after he had read the note. The Duc was speaking only of a general European war in which he might have an active part.

The Duc d'Enghien, then, had come to Ettenheim because of his love for the Princess Charlotte ; he knew nothing of the conspiracy of Georges Cadoudal ; and he was also glad to stay at Ettenheim near the frontiers of France, because in case of war or disturbance it was a good place from which to invade France and restore the Bourbons to the throne.²

Meanwhile the conspiracy of Georges Cadoudal, too well known to need describing, had been rapidly developing, and Bonaparte and his spies had already begun to scent trouble in the air. The English newspapers were said to contain hints at some sudden uprising in France and extracts from an old pamphlet written against Cromwell, entitled "*Killing no Murder*."³ The First Consul's spies in the west of France and in Normandy had noted a suspicious agitation among the peasants and a gathering of armed bands of Chouans ; and the spies in Germany reported great activity on the part of the English agents, especially of Drake at Munich. What

¹ Austrian Record Office, quoted in Boulay, p. 288.

² The opinion of Massias, the French envoy to Baden, in which Ettenheim lay, is worth quoting for its good sense and justness and because no one was in a better position to know about what went on in Baden than himself. He wrote to Talleyrand, the moment he heard of the Duc's arrest, "The Duc d'Enghien is a Royalist full of loyalty ; he hates England and is humiliated at having to live on a pension ; he economizes to be able to do without it ; he lives at Ettenheim in great simplicity, giving to the poor in accordance with his means ; he was not made for intrigue, hates all cowardice and abhors assassins." Foreign Office of Baden, quoted in Boulay, p. 321.

³ Nougarede de Fayet, *Recherches Historiques sur le Procès et la Condamnation du Duc d'Enghien* (2 vols., Paris, 1844) I. 32.

did all these suspicious movements and indications signify? was the question Bonaparte asked himself at the beginning of 1804.

Throughout 1803 several persons had been arrested in Paris or near the coasts because they were suspected of having communication with England or could give no good account of themselves. One of these, to save his life (January 24, 1804), revealed the secret that Georges was somewhere in Paris with the purpose of killing the First Consul, that three disembarkations of Royalists had been made in Normandy at a smugglers' rendezvous called Biville, and that a fourth important landing was to be attempted in a short time. Bonaparte now set his spies to work to find the exact hiding-place of Georges and who his accomplices were. He also sent his aide-de-camp, Savary, later created Duc de Rovigo, to Biville to watch for the fourth disembarkation. In a few days an English brig appeared in the offing, which a Chouan assured Savary was the same vessel that had landed Royalists before. But though Savary acted cautiously and tried to lure the brig in with false signals, she still held off and finally stood back for the English coast.¹ Either the Comte d'Artois or his son, whichever was on board, had had a warning that the plot was discovered; or perhaps at the last moment their caution got the better of their courage and they preferred safety in England to danger in France. Savary waited at Biville for a month, hoping that the brig would return; then he returned to Paris and reported himself to Bonaparte on March 19, just in time to play his part in the tragedy of the Duc d'Enghien.

While Savary was thus trying to entrap Bourbons and conspirators on the coast of Normandy, revelations obtained in Paris as to the relations between Pichegru and Moreau led to Moreau's arrest on February 15; and on February 28, Pichegru, who, next to Georges Cadoudal, was the most prominent man in the plot, was

¹ Savary gives a detailed account of his mission to Normandy in his *Mémoires* (Paris, 1829) II. 10-45, and of his share in the execution of the Duc in the following thirty pages, though not quite truthfully. Their veracity was attacked in 1823 and he at once wrote in his defense, but without any more regard to the strict truth than before, a "*Supplementary Chapter on the Catastrophe of the Duc d'Enghien*;" this may be found on pp. 347-489 in his *Mémoires*, Vol. II. Much of what Savary has to say on this affair may also be found, under the title *Extrait des Mémoires de M. le Duc de Rovigo*, in the *Catastrophe du Duc d'Enghien*, pp. 9-56, one of a series of books entitled *Mémoires Historiques sur la Révolution Française* (Baudouin Frères, Paris, 1823). This book also contains, among other material relating to the Duc d'Enghien's death, two considerable pamphlets which were called out by Savary's accusations and by the heated discussion which took place in 1823: Dupin's *Discussion des Actes de la Commission Militaire*, pp. 57-113, and Hulin's *Explications Offertes aux Hommes Impartiaux*, pp. 115-125. It is interesting to see Hulin and Savary laying the blame for certain things upon each other, but as they were both the agents of Bonaparte it makes little difference, so far as his personal liability is concerned, which of his agents executed his orders.

seized in the house of a friend who had given him shelter and then betrayed him.

One of the First Consul's secret agents at this time was a certain Méhée la Touche. An old Septembriseur and ardent Jacobin, Méhée was one of the numerous persons of whom Bonaparte had rid himself by banishment on the ground that he had had something to do with the infernal machine of the 3d Nivôse. Hearing from his wife in Paris that the Grand Judge could perhaps obtain a pardon for him to return to France if he would render some signal service to his country, he determined to see what treachery could accomplish, and sent a note to the British Cabinet, declaring that he had abjured his old errors of the Revolution and was ready to unite himself to the cause of the Bourbons; he said that he and many Jacobin friends in Paris formed a Republican committee which was opposed to the Consulate; that they could be reconciled with the Royalists, who also opposed the Consulate; and that together they could accomplish something against the First Consul. Méhée said that he could bring about this alliance of Jacobins and Royalists, if they would give him money with which to go to Paris; that on his way he would take a look at the situation in Germany and have a talk with Drake, the English envoy at Munich, who would get him a passport into France and give him letters to Royalist friends. The English government swallowed the bait and gave him the money. Drake was a foolish, self-important official without too scrupulous a conception of the behavior expected of diplomatic agents, and with a great taste for the excitement and secrecy of conspiracies. When, therefore, Méhée came to him in October 1803, with a smile on his face and the references of the British government in his hand, and spoke knowingly of a Jacobin committee in Paris desirous of uniting with the Royalists, and of many other fictitious things, Drake at once fell into the trap, delighted at the prospective chance of intriguing in France. He gave Méhée 10,000 francs, a passport into France under an assumed name, and letters of introduction to many English agents and Royalists, including the Comte de Musset and several émigrés who formed a harmless little group of malcontents at Offenburg, a town in Baden about six miles north of Ettenheim, and, like it, but a short distance from the Rhine frontier. Méhée made their acquaintance and then passed on into France to tell Bonaparte his plan to deceive the English agents as to the real plans of the French, while at the same time learning the plans of the English themselves. Bonaparte was pleased with the idea and for the next three months carried on a continual correspondence with Drake through Méhée, Drake of course never suspecting that his communications, of little

real importance to be sure, ever reached any other ears than those of Méhée and his Jacobin-Royalist fellow-intriguers.

When, in January 1804, the rumors of a conspiracy against the First Consul began to be confirmed, Méhée was directed to write and ask Drake what news he had of the landing of Georges and the Royalists; but Drake replied that what Méhée mentioned in his letter was the first and only knowledge he had received of any Royalist landing in Normandy, so that the French government felt convinced that he knew nothing of the Georges conspiracy. As there had been frequent reports that Royalists were stirring actively on the right bank of the Rhine, Méhée went to Offenbourg toward the end of February to see for himself what was going on. He there again met M. de Musset, who gladly renewed his confidences to Bonaparte's spy, telling him that several old officers of the army of Condé in the pay of England had come to Offenbourg lately to organize, and that they were acting in concert with the Duc d'Enghien, to whom they were going to join themselves when they should get instructions from England.¹ Méhée returned to Strasburg to write a report to Réal² of what he had learned at Offenbourg.

Réal received Méhée's report on March 1 and showed it to Bonaparte, who read it carefully and was struck with the mention of the Duc d'Enghien's name; he asked Réal exactly where it was in Baden that the Duc was living and whether he was still there. Réal did not know; he learned from the foreign office (Talleyrand) that it was at Ettenheim, but could not find out whether he was still there. Bonaparte then directed Réal to write to Shée, the prefect of the Lower Rhine at Strasburg, to find if the Duc d'Enghien was still at Ettenheim. "The information which you are to collect must be prompt and sure," said the letter; "in case the Duc is no longer in the town you are to inform me immediately by a special courier, and tell me at the same time the exact moment when he disappeared, what direction he took, and what is his supposed destination."³ Bonaparte was evidently agitated at the news about the Duc d'Enghien and anxious to have exact and immediate information as to his whereabouts; it seems quite probable that the idea of seizing the Duc dates from this moment, and that this is why he was in such haste for exact information; he had just heard that

¹ Nougarede, I. 167.

² Since the dismissal of Fouché some months before and the consequent abolishment of the Ministry of General Police, this part of the administration—the care of the internal safety of the state—had been given over to a Councillor of State, who happened at this time to be Réal; this Councillor of State was subject to the direction of the Grand Judge, or Minister of Justice, M. Regnier.

³ Nougarede, I. 172.

one of the Bourbons had escaped his grasp in Normandy ; why, thought he, was not this other Bourbon in Ettenheim just as good to make an example of? Upon the receipt of this letter Shée despatched an under officer, named Lamothe, to Ettenheim to make a report in accordance with Réal's order,—the report which was to result so fatally for the young prince.

The success of Méhée, and the favor of the First Consul of which he boasted, roused a spirit of rivalry in the officers along the Rhine, and induced them to spy upon the doings at Offenbourg and make reports to Paris of what they found. Prefect Shée showed himself especially active in discovering everything and denouncing everything. Popp, a police commissioner, and General Leval, commandant of the division at Strasburg, both wrote letters, which must have reached Bonaparte on the second or third of March, denouncing the Baroness de Reich and other émigrés at Offenbourg. "One sees there," said Popp, "a number of French émigrés, among whom there must be some persons of distinction. But from the information which I have been able to procure, it does not appear that this assemblage is dangerous ; however, the government may judge that it deserves some attention."¹ This language was moderate ; that of Leval passed all bounds : "You have undoubtedly been informed," he wrote to Regnier, "of the intrigues which are being hatched at Offenbourg by the six or seven hundred émigrés who are living there."² As a result of these and many similar reports Regnier, on March 7, reported to Bonaparte through Talleyrand that there was a committee of French émigrés in the pay of the English government at Offenbourg, whose object was to excite trouble in France by all possible methods ; that it had as its chief agent a man named Mucey (Musset), who, having bribed the necessary postmasters, was introducing into France "incendiary mandates of rebel bishops, as well as the infamous libels which are manufactured in foreign parts to the detriment of France and its government."³ Regnier ended his report by suggesting that the First Consul get hold of these obnoxious persons. This was an easy matter for Bonaparte ; knowing well that the Elector of Baden would not dare to refuse what he demanded, he caused Talleyrand to write a note to Carlsruhe requesting the Elector to seize and extradite to France these fomentors of disorder. This note was despatched from Paris on March 10, but before the Elector could act on it, Bonaparte had

¹ Boulay de la Meurthe, 127.

² *Ibid.*, note 2.

³ Talleyrand, *Memoirs* (trans. by A. Hall), III. 207 *seq.* and Boulay de la Meurthe, p. 308.

already taken matters into his own hands. This was the first touch of his severity ; more important measures were in reserve.

While Bonaparte, angry at the escape of the Comte d'Artois, provoked that Georges, the chief actor in the conspiracy against his life, was still at large in Paris, and annoyed at the apparent military activity on the right bank of the Rhine and at the presence of the Austrian troops in Bavaria, waited in Paris for Lamothe's report, that agent had left Strasburg on March 4, and, having stopped a little while at Kappel to gather information, reached Ettenheim at nightfall ; then returning by way of Offenburg early next morning, he reached Strasburg in time to make out his report the same day. One copy of this report was given to the prefect Shée, who, after adding a report of his own, sent it to Réal, who received it on the 9th of March ; and another copy was, according to military custom, sent by Lamothe to Moncey, his superior officer in the gendarmerie, who received it early on the morning of March 8 and showed it to the First Consul about eleven o'clock. In it he read¹ that the Duc d'Enghien was still at Ettenheim ; that he lived there simply, hunted daily, and seemed to be loved by every one in the neighborhood ; that it was supposed that he intended to remove soon to Freiburg in the Breisgau, Austrian territory ; and that for several weeks he had some interchange of letters with that town and with Offenburg. These details of Lamothe's were true, but the rest of the report, founded upon induction rather than upon facts, contained absurd blunders into which his credulous imagination had led him. After greatly exaggerating the number and importance of the émigrés at Offenburg, he declared that with the Duc were two old officers of the army of Condé, named Grunstein and Smith, who had recently arrived from England. This was absolutely false ; Schmitt, not Smith, was a native of Hesse-Darmstadt and had not come from England ; Grunstein was an aged major who had lived for two years in Baden and intended soon to go to Austria. But the greatest blunder, and that which was most fatal to the young prince, was that Lamothe, hearing at Kappel from some German lips that a man named "Thumery" was at Ettenheim, understood his informant to pronounce the name of the revolutionary General "Dumouriez," who had been a traitor in 1793 and was lately known to be with the Royalists in England.

At the sight of Dumouriez's name, Bonaparte, imagining that Drake, Enghien, Dumouriez, Georges, and the whole body of Royalists were in one great conspiracy against him, lost all control of himself, and, bursting with anger, broke forth, "Am I a dog to be

¹ Report of Lamothe, Nougarede, I. 208-210.

knocked to death in the street? Why was I not warned that they were assembling at Ettenheim? Are my murderers sacred beings? They attack my very person. I'll give them blow for blow."¹ Then as Réal entered, Bonaparte turned upon him and asked him why he had not told him "that Enghien and Dumouriez were plotting against his life within four miles of the frontier? What good were his police?"² To which Réal replied that he had told Bonaparte all he knew and was still waiting for his own copy of the report from Shée and Lamothe, which in fact did not come till the next day, but which would only have made Bonaparte all the angrier; for Shée, not only confirmed all that Lamothe had said as true, but added that Enghien had often entered France as far as Strasburg, which was, as shown above, equally false. Then he turned upon Talleyrand in the same manner, demanding how it was that Massias, the *chargé d'affaires* of France at Carlsruhe, had not reported upon such facts to the foreign office. In vain did Talleyrand try to allay his anger by reminding him that the presence of the prince in the electorate had long been known to him,³ that he had even charged Talleyrand to inform the Elector that the prince might reside at Ettenheim.⁴ Then instead of trying to protect his inferior, Talleyrand, believing it easier to accuse him, declared that Massias had neglected to mention the intrigues which were being carried on at Offenbourg, perhaps either because he did not think it of sufficient importance, or because he had married a relative of the Baroness de Reich, one of the chief disturbing spirits of Offenbourg, and feared to compromise her.⁵

The events of the following day (March 9) only tended to confirm Bonaparte in his opinion that there was one great concerted plot against him, with Dumouriez and Enghien at the head of it, on the Rhine frontier. Dumouriez, in all the various places to which his ambition had led him, had always shown that he had an enterprising spirit, a mind fertile in devising unscrupulous schemes and an adventurous temperament to try anything which might better his

¹ Desmarest, *Témoignages Hist.*, p. 128, quoted by Boulay de la Meurthe, p. 140, note 1.

² Ségur, *Mémoires*, II. 227, seq.; L. Constant, *Le Duc d'Enghien*, pp. 8-10.

³ Massias wrote to Talleyrand Sept. 15, 1803, "J'apprends que le Duc d'Enghien est à Ettenheim chez le Prince de Rohan." But it is not certain that the Minister of Foreign Affairs told the First Consul of the fact at that time.

⁴ Talleyrand states twice in his *Mémoires* (III. 211, 213) that he was instructed by the First Consul to inform the Elector that he had no objection to the Duc's living at Ettenheim.

⁵ This was a lie, and Bonaparte evidently suspected as much, for shortly afterward in a letter to Réal (*Corr. de Nap.*, IX. 7631), he says, "I beg you to see whether Massias is married or not, and what are the grounds of suspicion against him."

fortune. Bonaparte knew all this and perceived that he was just the man to engage in a plan to overturn the consular government. Precisely at this moment a despatch was received from the French ambassador at Naples enclosing a letter addressed to Admiral Nelson, in which Dumouriez expressed himself as follows: "It is not enough for England to be prepared to receive the enemy, she must go to seek him; if they take my advice they will make an important expedition which I have advised, the success of which cannot be doubted."¹ This was the plan, Bonaparte felt sure, which Dumouriez had come to carry out with the aid of the Duc d'Enghien, who must likewise therefore be a dangerous person.

This day was not to end without fresh appearances of the Duc's guilt being added to the preceding false evidence, already probably sufficient to have led to his seizure. In the evening Georges Cadoudal, who up to this time had succeeded in evading the most diligent efforts of the police, was recognized in a cabriolet in one of the streets of Paris, and arrested after a desperate resistance. On being questioned, he boldly declared that he had come to Paris with the express intention of making an open attack on the First Consul, and had only been delaying to carry out his purpose until the arrival of a prince at Paris, who had not yet come. The preponderating part taken by the Bourbons in the plot had long been suspected by Bonaparte; after such a formal declaration it could no longer be doubted. The only question was, *which* prince did Georges refer to? If Bonaparte had looked at the question dispassionately, and used his reason, he could have had no doubt, from the declarations which prisoners had already made, that this prince was the Comte d'Artois, who had promised to place himself at Georges' side at the critical moment; but who, as Georges said, had not yet been able to arrive at Paris, having turned back when he had come in sight of Normandy. But Bonaparte did not choose to look at it in this way; since reading Lamothe's report he had fixed it in his mind that Enghien was the guilty Bourbon prince. Why was it not likely that the Comte d'Artois, who fled so quickly in time of danger, had found in his rash young relative on the Rhine, who dared to do anything, the necessary auxiliary to Georges' plans, and that the Duc d'Enghien was to come to Paris instead of the Comte d'Artois? This idea was confirmed next morning by more evidence, fallaciously interpreted, like all the preceding evidence.

At the same time that Georges was seized, two of his servants were also arrested; in their examination the next morning, one of them, L  ridont, avowed that every little while there came to his

¹ Boulay de la Meurthe, 141.

master's house at Chaillot a mysterious man whose name he did not know ; but he thought the man must be a very important person, for he was well-dressed, and, whenever he came, everyone stood up, even the Polignacs and Rivière, and did not take their seats again till he was gone.¹ Having heard frequently that they were expecting a prince, Lérident said he thought this strange visitor might be he. The First Consul seized eagerly upon this information and compared it with Shée's statement, which he had received the day before, and thought it true, though in reality it was not, that Enghien had frequently entered France as far as Strasburg to go to the théâtre, if not for other purposes, and that he was often absent five or six days from Ettenheim in hunting expeditions ; he immediately concluded that if the Duc risked his life to go to Strasburg merely for the theatre, he would surely dare to come to Paris for a matter of such importance as a conference with his fellow-conspirators ; that when he had been said to be absent from Ettenheim six days on a hunt, he had in reality been in Paris—two days to come, two days to stay and plot, and two days to return again to Ettenheim. Suppositions excited by fear and suspicion are of rapid growth. So strong was the idea that it was the Duc d'Enghien who had been in Paris, and that he even then might be in the city, that the principal houses in the Faubourg St. Germain were searched to see whether he was not actually in hiding at that moment, or whether preparations had not been made to receive him.² What has already been said of the Duc d'Enghien's manner of living and way of thinking need not be repeated to show the absurdity of the idea that he might be skulking secretly about in Paris. But, on the other hand, it is possible to see how the First Consul, drawing his inferences from false evidence, and looking at things, not with the fair eye of a judge, but with the eye of a man full of anger at the discovery of a conspiracy against his life, decided to seize and court-martial immediately those whom he believed to be leagued against him. We may at least do Bonaparte the justice to suppose that on March 10, when he ordered the arrest of the Duc d'Enghien, he honestly believed that he was arresting a guilty conspirator and averting a terrible catastrophe from France and from himself.

Bonaparte's experience in war and politics had taught him how necessary a quick decision and prompt execution are to success. Already the note had been despatched to the Elector of Baden ask-

¹ Nougarede, I. 237. This man was probably Pichegru, for Lérident, in repeating the names of all the friends of Georges, had not mentioned that of Pichegru ; Pichegru was, however, somewhat older than the man described.

² Méneval, *Memoirs of Napoleon I.*, I. 249 (trans. by Sherard, 3 vols., London, 1894).

ing for the arrest of the Baroness de Reich and others ;¹ he might also now have asked the Elector to extradite Dumouriez and Enghien, and the Elector would have been glad to comply ; but Bonaparte feared that before the Elector could arrest them, his birds would have flown. Therefore he had made up his mind that the only course to pursue was to send a small body of troops into the electorate and seize the conspirators himself.

Fouché had not been inactive since his dismissal ; he often used to come and tell the First Consul news which he had secured, thanks to the influence which he had retained over the police agents and the confidences which he extracted from them, thus beating the Grand Judge at his own business. This sharper, like Talleyrand, advised the First Consul to make an example of the Duc d'Enghien which should forever strike terror into the hearts of all Bourbons and Royalists. Talleyrand further suggested that such an extreme measure would forever dispel the feeling, supposed to be entertained by some, that Napoleon would betray the Revolution and play the part in France which Monk had played in England. As for the violation of neutral territory, Talleyrand undertook to make it right with the Elector. That both Fouché and Talleyrand urged the First Consul to take this step there can be no doubt ;² but it is almost equally certain that it was not they who decided him to take the step, for upon that he had already made up his mind for himself, either on the morning of the 10th or more probably previously ;³ their arguments merely added weight to his decision. After these separate talks a council, composed of the three Consuls, Talleyrand, and the Grand Judge, was held on March 10 in the evening. The Grand Judge opened the meeting with a review of the numerous proofs of the Duc's guilt. Talleyrand and Fouché repeated their reasons for favoring severity. Consul Lebrun spoke of the outcry which such an act would call forth in France and in Europe ; but before the close of the council he had been induced by the others to favor the seizure. Cambacérès alone pronounced himself decidedly op-

¹ Talleyrand's note of March 10 ; *supra*, p. 627.

² Both these wily men believed that their interests were not different from those of Bonaparte. Talleyrand saw that the destruction of the First Consul would in all probability overturn the fortunes of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, for he was suspected by the Jacobins on account of his birth and by the Royalists on account of his acts ; but that to disarm the conspirators by a sudden blow would be to secure to both First Consul and Minister a power which was to increase with the Empire which was already talked of. Fouché also hoped to be reappointed Minister of Police in the new imperial government. Pasquier, I. 208-214 ; Méneval, I. 269-271 ; Welschinger, 410-448 ; Chateaubriand, *Mémoires d'Outre Tombe*, II. 417-425 (Paris, 1880) ; Bourrienne, *Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte*, II. 254-284 (trans. by Phipps, New York, 1889).

³ On March 1, when his attention was first seriously directed to Ettenheim by Méhée's report ; *supra*, p. 626.

posed to the step ; he said he feared lest public opinion, which was already aroused in regard to Moreau, might suddenly turn in favor of the heir of the great Condé, whose youthful inexperience had been taken advantage of by Dumouriez's practised knavery ; that it was only too easy to revive the remembrance of the Reign of Terror in men's minds ; and finally that if the Duc, who they said had come to Strasburg and Paris, should dare to enter France again, then they could seize him and everyone would recognize that he was justly put to death. Bonaparte listened to Cambacérès without impatience,¹ and then closed the council by announcing that his mind was made up to have the Duc seized.

Bonaparte then sent for his secretary, Méneval, Berthier, Minister of War, and Generals Caulaincourt and Ordener,² and took down his maps of the Rhine frontier. When they had come, he dictated to Méneval precise instructions for the conduct of the capturing party, and at the same time pointed out on the map with his finger to Caulaincourt and Ordener the route which they were to take. These instructions³ were so carefully prearranged that they were followed out four days later to the very letter. Ordener was to go to Ettenheim in the night and seize the Duc, Dumouriez, and all other suspected persons found there, and bring them prisoners to Strasburg. On the same night another body of troops under the command of Caulaincourt was to march to Offenbourg and seize all émigrés and other suspects who had been denounced by Méhée. Caulaincourt was further directed to place patrols on the road from Offenbourg to Ettenheim to protect Ordener, and as soon as he heard that Ordener had been successful, to send a note to the Elector telling him what had been done. Talleyrand was the man who prepared this letter,⁴ which was more of a reproach than an apology, to a man who would not dare to resent it. Bonaparte had now given the order for the seizure ; the execution of it was left to his

¹ Cambacérès, *Mém. Inédites* (quoted in Boulay, p. 154).

² Méneval, I. 250-255 ; Doris, *Memoirs of Napoleon*, 113 (London, 1896).

³ *Corr. de Nap.*, 7608.

⁴ "I had just written you a note asking for the arrest of the committee of émigrés at Offenbourg, when the First Consul, by the successive arrests of the brigands whom the English government has vomited upon the shores of France . . . learned the whole part which the English agents at Offenbourg have had in the horrible plots hatched up against his own person and the safety of France. He has heard in the same way that the Duc d'Enghien and General Dumouriez were at Ettenheim . . . and could only see with the greatest grief that His Electoral Highness . . . had given an asylum to his most cruel enemies and allowed them to hatch in peace such unheard-of plots. In these extraordinary circumstances the First Consul has believed it his duty to order two small detachments to go to Offenbourg and Ettenheim to seize there the instigators of a crime which, by its nature, puts outside the law of nations all persons who have clearly taken part in it . . ." Nougarede, I. 265 ; Talleyrand, *Memoirs*, III. 212.

subordinates. Meanwhile he went to Malmaison to spend a week until the whole affair of the Duc d'Enghien had been settled.

After receiving his instructions, General Ordener left Paris on March 11, and arrived at Strasburg late the following night. The next day, Tuesday, the 13th, he talked over the necessary preparations with Prefect Shée and Leval, the commander of the troops at Strasburg, and decided to send a couple of spies, named Stohl and Pfersdorf, to Ettenheim the next day to see that all was favorable for making the seizure. Caulaincourt, who had to wait for Talleyrand's note to the Elector and for some other instructions relative to the seizure of the Baroness de Reich and her papers, did not reach Strasburg till the afternoon of Wednesday. The two spies having returned about the same time, and reported that the Duc was still there, though they had not actually seen him, and that all was quiet, it was decided by Caulaincourt, Ordener, and Leval that not the slightest change need be made in Bonaparte's orders. They accordingly despatched the courier Thibaud to announce to Bonaparte that his orders were to be put into execution that very night (Wednesday, March 14). Ordener, who had much farther to go, set off immediately for Schlestadt, where he got some dragoons and proceeded straight to Rhinau. Here boats had been collected to take across the three hundred dragoons and the detachment of gendarmes who comprised the party. With him went Fririon the commandant of the department, Charlot, chief of the gendarmes, and the spy Pfersdorf. Ordener effected the crossing some time after midnight and proceeded straight to Ettenheim by way of Kappel and Altdorf.¹

Of the details of the arrest and of what happened at Ettenheim a day or two previously, we have an excellent account entitled, "Les derniers jours de la vie de Monseigneur le duc d'Enghien," written by M. de Bonnay as the events were related to him a year later by Canone, a faithful servant of the Duc.²

"On March 12," says Canone in his delightfully simple, honest narrative, "the Duc was secretly warned that Bonaparte wished to have him seized; the news came from a trustworthy person who begged the Prince to quit Ettenheim immediately.³ But the Duc, little accustomed to believe in danger and still less to flee

¹ A detailed map accompanies the *Examen Impartial des Calomnies répandues sur M. de Caulaincourt à l'Occasion de la Catastrophe de Mgr. le Duc d'Enghien* which is found in *Catastrophe du Duc d'Enghien*, 127-233.

² This is reprinted by Boulay, pp. 170-188. This account may be supplemented by Charlot's detailed report in *Catastrophe du Duc d'Enghien*, pp. 229-233.

³ As Ordener did not arrive at Strasburg till late on the night of the 12th, no news of the expedition could have reached the Duc on that day; this was probably one of the warnings founded on likelihood only, of which the Duc had already received several.

from it, disregarded this advice, which he treated as fiction." On the 13th the Duc went hunting, but having heard the rumors of the arrest of the Baroness de Reich, "told Canone to keep watch during the night in the streets of Ettenheim. This unfortunate prince was persuaded that if Bonaparte dared to have him seized, it would only be by means of a small body of disguised brigands, and that, provided he were not surprised in his sleep, it would be easy to defend himself against them." Early Wednesday morning (March 14), Canone saw through the windows of the first story two men who were looking attentively at the house,—Stohl and Pfersdorf. "Canone went to tell his master of his discovery and offered to follow these two men and give a good account of them to him. But the Duc told Canone that he was nervous and that he was frightening himself with chimeras; he bade him calm himself, but to observe the two men and see what became of them. Canone ran off and soon returned to tell the prince that the spy Pfersdorf was keeping watch at the door of the inn, without doubt to see when he went out and get a description of him, but that as the Duc had not come out soon enough, the man, tired of waiting, had given up hope and gone away. Canone wished to follow him on horseback, but the Duc, fearing the excess and warmth of his zeal, was opposed to it, and sent in his stead Lieutenant Schmitt to try to discover the doings of the spy." Then the Duc and Canone went out into the woods to hunt, "when a peasant, coming through the woods, met them and gave the prince a letter. It was written by a resident on the left bank of the Rhine, personally known to the Duc d' Enghien¹; it said in substance that troops were moving in the neighborhood and that all the boats had been brought to the left bank of the river as if to convey the troops across; it begged the prince to betake himself at the close of day to a little island opposite Ettenheim; the writer of the letter assured him that he would be there and would give him further details. At this news the Duc called off the dogs and returned to

¹ M. Roesch, notary public at Rhinau; there can be no doubt of this touching incident. General Fririon relates in his *Memoirs* (quoted in Welschinger, p. 273) that he was "dining with a certain M. Stumpf, . . . when I received an order to cross the Rhine during the night with a detachment of cavalry and go to arrest the Duc d' Enghien at Ettenheim. I was violently agitated on reading this order, which involved a violation of territory and which, for this very reason, appeared to me profoundly unjust. . . . Time pressed; I did not know the Duc d' Enghien; I had never even seen him; but even though I endangered myself, I did not hesitate to send him a warning and urge him to take his flight, feeling sure that in hindering the government from making an arbitrary arrest, I should avoid embarrassing it with a person who was not dangerous to its security." He then left the table, beckoned M. Stumpf into a private room, and, telling him the contents of the order, begged him to warn the prince. Stumpf accordingly wrote to Roesch at Rhinau, who in turn sent the note to the Duc in the forest.

Ettenheim. He went at once to the room of his secretary, M. Jacques, . . . and read him the letter he had just received. As the hour drew near, M. Jacques was of the opinion that this was no time for hesitation and that His Highness ought to go to the place indicated. After a moment of silence the Duc replied, 'All things considered, I shall not go.' M. Jacques then proposed to send Canone and the Duc consented. But it was fated that this unfortunate prince should reject all the pieces of advice which might have saved him; at the moment when Canone was about to start, he made him stay. It was afterwards known that the giver of this advice went according to his promise and not without danger to the rendezvous, waited there a long time, and finally returned, having despaired of being able to let the prince know all that he had discovered since the time of sending the letter . . . "

But from the preparations which the Duc made that evening it is clear that he himself gave much thought to the contents of the letter and felt that it would be better to take some precautions. "He had two beds put in the room next his own, one for Grunstein and the other for Schmitt. When he had undressed he asked for his arms, had them put on a table with some ammunition, and then ordered Canone to go and make sure that all the doors of the house were well fastened; finally he told him to have his gun by his side when he lay down." They all went to bed about eleven o'clock—the moment when the French troops were preparing to cross the river at Rhinau. About two o'clock in the morning Lieut. Schmitt thought he heard the stamping of horses. He roused Baron Grunstein; both went to the window and waited and listened. The night was so dark they could not see anything; the noise stopped. After a short conversation in a low voice they cast themselves, tired out, upon their beds, but ready to get up at the least alarm.

A little after five o'clock—the fifteenth of March was just dawning in the east—the sound of horses was heard again, this time more clearly and distinctly. Grunstein and Schmitt reopened the window and saw Charlot's gendarmes scaling the walls. The Duc, roused by the same noise, cried to Canone, "Quick with your gun! they are at the door!" Seizing their guns they both went to the windows, opened them and looked out ready to fire. "Who is in command?" shouted the Duc. "We do not have to account to you," replied a voice. The Duc took aim at the man who had spoken, when Grunstein, stepping in from the next room, laid his hand on his arm and asked, "Are you compromised?" To the Duc's reply that he was not, Grunstein said there was no use resisting, especially as the court was full of soldiers, and it would only make matters worse to shoot their officer.¹

¹ Narratives of Canone, Schmitt and Charlot. It seems, however, that Grunstein

"Then Canone, seeing that all was lost, ran to a servant's room where he still had some hope of saving the Duc; two footmen had already left successfully out of the windows; if the Duc had tried it he would never have been found nor harmed; the two footmen never were. Canone returned to beg him to do this, since resistance was no longer possible. But the Duc could never make up his mind to flee." A moment later the gendarmes entered the room, and Charlot ordered his men to take all the prisoners, including Jacques, who for some days had been sick in bed, outside the town and wait for him near a mill called the Tuileries on the road to Kappel. Here again Canone's narrative shows his devotion to his master and his own harmless self-conceit: "Here by the mill was a small stream which people crossed on a narrow plank. Canone made several signs to the Duc to show him the passage. From the other side of the stream it was only a five minutes' run to reach the vineyard, and if the Duc, who ran better than anybody, could have reached it, he would have been lost from sight; some balls would, perhaps, have whistled about his ears; but he would have escaped. This inspiration of Canone, who, as we have seen, never lost his head for an instant, was the fifth or sixth means of safety which he had indicated to his master; the others had been rejected; this last was not understood."

Meanwhile Charlot had gone to the house where Pfersdorf said Dumouriez lived, and found there, not the ex-general as he had expected, but only the aged Marquis de Thumery. "I gathered information," said Charlot in his report, "to know whether Dumouriez had appeared at Ettenheim; I was assured that he had not; I presume that this was only a supposition, resulting from confounding his name with that of General Thumery. . . The Duc d'Enghien has assured me that Dumouriez has not come to Ettenheim; that, however, it was possible that he had been charged to bring him instructions from England, but that he had not received them, because it was beneath his rank to have anything to do with such men." There was no longer the slightest doubt of the blunder about

was mistaken in thinking resistance was useless. Ordener and the main body of troops had not yet arrived, either being delayed in crossing the Rhine or having waited outside of Ettenheim. Ségur, who a few weeks later heard the account of the seizure from Charlot's own mouth at Strasburg, says (*Mémoires*, Vol. II., p. 257), "The fatal shot would have been fired, thus beginning a conflict in which all the chances, according to the commandant himself, would have been *against* the assailants, when the prince's evil genius caused Grunstein to put his hand," etc. Boulay de la Meurthe (p. 179) quotes a police note to the following effect: "The Duc had sixty shots ready to fire and seven persons with him. The house was as yet surrounded by only thirty gendarmes and dragoons. If resistance had been made and the villagers, who were devoted to the Duc, had had time to arrive, the result of the expedition would have been uncertain, and, whatever it had been, French blood would have been spilled."

Dumouriez.¹ Then, having possessed himself of all the Duc's papers, Charlot returned to the mill, put the prince and the other prisoners in a peasant's cart, and conducted the sad group back to the Rhine by way of Graffhausen and Kappel, and thence finally to Strasburg, which they reached about four in the afternoon.

This same Thursday afternoon, after Caulaincourt and Ordener had returned to Strasburg, they despatched the courier Amadour to Bonaparte to announce the successful arrest of the Duc. The two days, which elapsed before further orders from the First Consul reached Strasburg, were for the unhappy prisoner full of gloom and uncertainty as to the future.² He was also much troubled in his heart for the Princess Charlotte, lest the news might prostrate her, or lest she might attempt to follow him and share his lot. Friday morning he wrote to her: "My whole fear is that this letter will not reach you at Ettenheim and that you have already started to come here. . . They believe that Dumouriez and I have had conferences together, and apparently he is implicated in the conspiracy against the life of the First Consul. But my ignorance of that whole matter makes me hope that I shall obtain my liberty soon. . . The attachment of my servants draws tears to my eyes constantly; they could have escaped; they were not forced to follow me; they preferred to; I have Féron, Joseph and Poulain; good Mohiloff³ has not left me for a single step. . . Adieu, princess; you have known for a long time my tender and sincere attachment for you; free or in prison it will always be the same. . ."⁴ This touching letter, full of tenderness and confidence, never reached its destination.

On Friday, March 16, the Duc wrote in his journal: "At half past four, they come to examine my papers, which Col. Charlot, accompanied by a commissary of safety [Popp], opens in my presence. They read them superficially. They do them up in separate bundles and leave me to understand that they are to be sent to Paris. I must then languish weeks, perhaps months! My grief increases, the more I reflect on my cruel position. I go to bed at eleven o'clock; I am worn out and cannot sleep."

The following day was less sad. In the afternoon Charlot came to him to get him to sign the procès-verbal of the opening of his papers. "I ask," wrote the prince in his journal, "and obtain per-

¹ This report reached Bonaparte March 19, so that he too knew two days before the execution of the Duc that he had been mistaken in thinking Dumouriez was at Ettenheim.

² See the *Private Journal of the Duc* from March 15 to March 18, which was taken from his pocket just before he was thrown into his grave. *Catastrophe du Duc d'Enghien*, pp. 88-91.

³ The Duc's dog.

⁴ Enghien to Princess Charlotte, quoted in Nougarede, I. 285-288.

mission to add an explanatory note to prove that I have never had any other intentions than to serve in war and make war."¹ The papers and procès-verbal were then despatched by Ordener to Bonaparte² and reached him Monday morning. But it is a significant fact, as will be pointed out below, that Bonaparte never sent these papers and the procès-verbal with this explicit denial by the Duc of his guilt, to the court-martial which was to try him and which ought to have had all the evidence before it; instead he sent them to Réal and told him to keep them secret.

Saturday evening the prince had been told that according to orders received from Paris he was to have more liberty in his captivity; he was shown a garden where he could walk and all the prisoners were to be allowed to attend mass together on the morrow, which was Passion Sunday. Seeing in this amelioration of the rigors of his captivity a possibility of early release, he went to bed happier than on the previous evenings.³ But he was cruelly disappointed. In the middle of the night he was suddenly awakened and given scarcely time to dress and no time at all to eat anything before he was hustled into a guarded carriage. His servants begged to be allowed to accompany him, but this was refused; the devoted Mohiloff jumped into the carriage however, and when the prince asked that this single friend might go with him, he was not refused. Long before day dawned over Strasburg the Duc d'Enghien was out on the dark highroad to Paris in the bitter chill of a March night, being hurried rapidly to his trial and death. He went under the false name of Plessis; it was Bonaparte's will that everything in connection with the Duc should be done secretly and in the night.

All this was in accordance with orders which had just arrived from the First Consul. It will be remembered that Caulaincourt had despatched the courier, Thibaud, to Bonaparte on the afternoon of March 15, a few hours before the seizure was made. Upon his arrival at Malmaison late the following night Bonaparte wrote to Réal: "I have received a courier from Strasburg. It is during the night of the 23-24 Ventôse (*i. e.*, March 14-15) that the expedition will take place. . . . Write immediately to General Caulaincourt that I have received his letter; that if they have

¹ "Que je n'ai jamais eu d'autres intentions que de servir et faire la guerre,"—*Catastrophe du Duc d'Enghien*, p. 90.

² The note which Ordener sent along with these papers is given in *Catastrophe du Duc d'Enghien*, p. 233. Ordener made an oversight in dating it 24 Ventôse (March 15) instead of 26 Ventôse (March 17); for the statement in the Duc's journal is explicit that his papers were opened on the 16th and sent with the procès-verbal by a special courier to Paris on the afternoon of March 17 (Saturday).

³ "Je soupe et me couche plus content." *Journal of the Duc*.

captured either the Duc d'Enghien or Dumouriez, he is to hurry them into two separate carriages under a good and sure guard and send them to Paris. . . . Ask the commandant at Vincennes for information about the individuals in that fortress and where he could put the prisoners."¹

The Duc d'Enghien had travelled steadily from Strasburg toward Paris without any event of importance, and reached the barrier outside the city about four o'clock Tuesday afternoon (March 20), having been about sixty-three hours on the road. When near Paris a courier had been despatched to Bonaparte at Malmaison to notify him that the Duc would reach the barrier at five o'clock in the afternoon at the latest. Bonaparte instantly sent a messenger to the barrier with orders that the carriage was to go around the walls, and that the Duc should be lodged in the castle of Vincennes.² It was, therefore, between six and seven o'clock that a weary prisoner, pale with fatigue, hunger and cold, known under the name of Plessis, was driven in at the drawbridge of the château of Vincennes. It was the third time that a Condé had entered its sombre walls as a prisoner. In 1627 Henri de Condé had been sent there by Richelieu; in 1650 "le grand Condé" by Mazarin. The first two had left its walls free and happy men; a different fate was awaiting this last scion of the great family.

Harel, who had been appointed by Bonaparte commandant of the castle of Vincennes in 1801 as a reward for his denunciation of the plot of Aréna and Céracchi, had been notified late that very afternoon by a letter from Réal that a "prisoner, whose name must not be known, . . . will probably arrive at the castle of Vincennes to-night. . . . It is the intention of the government that everything shall be kept very secret about him and that no questions shall be asked as to who he is or why he is detained."³ Harel received his mysterious prisoner kindly and sent immediately to a neighboring inn to get a supper for him, as the Duc had had nothing to eat since early morning. The meal was small, but the Duc insisted on sharing what there was of it with his devoted travelling companion, the faithful Mohiloff. After supper the Duc had some conversation with Harel and then went to bed early and dropped into a sound sleep after his two fatiguing days and nights on the journey.

SIDNEY B. FAY.

¹ Bonaparte to Réal, March 15; *Corr. de Nap.*, 7620.

² In view of all the contemporary evidence which says that the Duc's carriage went straight from the barrier along the outskirts of Paris to Vincennes, we do not agree with Welschinger's statement (p. 297 *seq.*) that the Duc was taken to Talleyrand's house, nor with the elaborate indictment against Talleyrand which he builds up on the theory that Talleyrand saw the Duc's carriage approaching his house and left it as fast as he could.

³ Nougarede, I. 305.